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Contracts for future delivery of commodities spread from Mesopotamia to Hellenistic Egypt 
and the Roman world. After the collapse of the Roman Empire, contracts for future delivery 
continued to be used in the Byzantine Empire in the eastern Mediterranean and they survived in 
canon law in western Europe. It is likely that Sephardic Jews carried derivative trading from 
Mesopotamia to Spain during Roman times and the first millennium AD, and, after being 
expelled from Spain, to the Low Countries in the sixteenth century. Derivative trading on 
securities spread from Amsterdam to England and France at the turn of the seventeenth to the 
eighteenth century, and from France to Germany in the early nineteenth century. Circumstantial 
evidence indicates that bankers and banks were at the forefront of derivative trading during the 




   1
Modern textbooks in financial economics often misrepresent the history of derivative 
securities. For example, in the opening sentence Hull (2006) suggests that derivatives became 
significant only during the past 25 years, and that it is only now that they are traded on 
exchanges.  
"In the last 25 years derivatives have become increasingly important in the world of finance. 
Futures and options are now traded actively on many exchanges throughout the world." (Hull 
2006, p. 1)  
 
Mishkin (2006) is even more adamant that derivatives are new financial instruments that 
were invented in the 1970s. He suggests that an increase in the volatility of financial markets 
created a demand for hedging instruments that were used by financial institutions to manage risk. 
Does he really believe that financial markets were insufficiently volatile to warrant derivative 
trading before the 1970s? 
 "Starting in the 1970s and increasingly in the 1980s and 90s, the world became a riskier place 
for the financial institutions described in this part of the book. Swings in interest rates widened, 
and the bond and stock markets went through some episodes of increased volatility. As a result of 
these developments, managers of financial institutions became more concerned with reducing the 
risk their institutions faced. Given the greater demand for risk reduction, the process of financial 
innovation described in Chapter 9 came to the rescue by producing new financial instruments that 
helped financial institution managers manage risk better. These instruments, called derivatives, 
have payoffs that are linked to previously issued securities and are extremely useful risk 
reduction tools." (Mishkin, 2006, p. 309) 
 
The widespread ignorance concerning the history of derivatives is explained by a dearth of 
research on the history of derivative trading. Even economic historians are not well informed 
about the long history of derivative markets. A review of three leading economic history journals 
- the Journal of Economic History, the Economic History Review and the European Review of 
Economic History - has yielded not a single article after 1990 with a title that would indicate that 
it deals with some aspect of the history of derivative securities. Similarly, the Oxford 
Encyclopedia of Economic History (2003) gives short shrift to derivative markets; it includes an 
entry on commodity futures in the United States in the nineteenth century and options are shortly   2
mentioned in the entry on the stock market. At the moment, articles on the history of derivatives 
can be found only in working papers and edited volumes. Goetzmann and Rouwenhorst (2005) 
includes an article by Gelderblom and Jonker on derivative trading in Amsterdam from 1550 to 
1650, and two volumes edited by Poitras (2006/2007) contain the so far most comprehensive 
collection of articles and sources on derivative markets during the past four hundred years.  
The history of derivatives has remained unexplored because there are few historical records 
of derivative dealings. Derivatives left no paper trail because they are private agreements that 
have been traded in over-the-counter markets for most of their history. Even today, the 
international commodity and financial markets, which have always been a primary focus of 
derivative dealings, remain beyond the reach of national statistical offices. Another reason why 
historical records of derivatives are scant is conceptual. A forward contract has no market value 
when it is set up, although its notional value may be large. Thus, how should a forward contract 
be recorded when it is set up? There is naturally no point in recording a zero value. This problem 
is even more acute with futures contracts whose market value does not deviate much from zero 
during their entire life. At the end of each day, the value of a futures contract is set back to zero 
by crediting or debiting the daily change in value to a margin account. The Triennial Central 
Bank Survey of the Bank for International Settlements, which was first published in 1989, for the 
first time addressed the conceptual and practical difficulties of recording derivative dealings in 
international over-the-counter markets.  
Since there are no official statistics on derivatives, economic historians must rely on other 
sources that provide evidence that derivatives were used, including laws and regulations, court 
decisions, charters and business conditions of exchanges and trading companies, and surviving 
derivative contracts. Undoubtedly, the long history of derivatives is little known because the 
examination of this material is a laborious task that requires special skills. Kindleberger (1996, p. 
5) remarked that “Historical research of a comparative sort relies on secondary sources, and   3
cannot seek for primary material only available in archives.” There are also not many historians 
and economists who are experts both in ancient languages and scripts and in financial economics. 
In this article, whenever possible secondary sources are used that quote primary sources, for 
example Ehrenberg (1928) and Swan (2000). A less reliable source that is also used is the 
testimony of financial practitioners who lived and worked in the period under consideration, 
including de la Vega (1688), Coffinière (1824) and Proudhon (1857).   
In this chapter the pioneering works of Louis Bachelier (1900) and Vincenz Bronzin (1908) 
are put into the historical context. In the first section a definition for the generic term “derivative” 
is given, and the origin of contracts for future delivery of goods in Mesopotamia and their use in 
the Greek and Roman world are discussed. In the second section it is shown how the use of 
derivatives spread from commodity markets to security markets in Italy and the Low Countries 
during the Renaissance. In the third section, which deals with speculation in Amsterdam in the 
seventeenth century, it is argued that derivative trading was based on reputation in pre-industrial 
times and beyond. Derivative trading in London and Paris in the eighteenth century is discussed 
in the fourth section, and the spread of derivative trading in continental Europe during the 
nineteenth century is considered in the fifth section. Around 1870, financial practitioners 
developed graphical tools to represent derivative contracts. Profit charts made derivatives 
accessible to young scientists, including Louis Bachelier and Vincenz Bronzin, who had the 
mathematical knowledge for the rigorous analysis of derivative pricing. In the last section two 
issues are considered that show how difficult it is to provide an unbiased account of the history of 
derivatives, using available sources. The focus in this chapter is on the mechanics of derivative 
dealings; no attention is paid to the emergence of the random walk hypothesis of asset prices, 
which provided the mathematical foundation for Bachelier and Bronzin’s work. The origin of the 
random walk hypothesis is discussed in Jovanovic (2006a) and Preda (2006). 
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1. The Origins of Derivatives in Antiquity 
  It is now hard to believe that the generic term “derivative”, which stands for all kinds of 
derivative products, has emerged only very recently, in the 1980s. Swan (2000, p. 5) traces it 
back to the 1982 New York Federal Court case of American Stock Exchange vs. Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission. A reliable definition of derivatives is crucial for regulators who are 
in charge of derivative markets, but the rapid development of new derivative products has 
rendered definitions quickly obsolete. A derivative should not be defined as a financial 
instrument whose value depends (is derived) from the value of some underlying asset because 
there is no such asset in the case of weather derivatives, electricity derivatives and the derivatives 
whose value depended on the outcome of papal elections in the sixteenth century (Swan 2000, p. 
142). Therefore, financial textbooks - for example Hull (2006, p. 1) - now define derivatives as 
financial instruments whose value can depend on “almost any variable”.  
Yet, also this definition of a derivative is incomplete because it does not recognize the risk 
that the counter-party of a derivative contract may default. During the financial crisis in 1987, the 
standard models of derivative pricing failed because they did not take account of the default risk 
that arose after the near-failure of Long-Term Capital Management. For this reason, Swan (2000, 
p. 18) defines a derivative contract as a “promise” whose market value depends, first, on the 
strength of the promissor’s ability to perform and, second, on the value of the underlying asset or 
variable. Similarly, Moser (2000, 1994), who investigates the history of clearing arrangements at 
the  Chicago Board of Trade, uses a definition of futures contracts that recognizes the non-
performance option of contract holders because “many futures-contract terms are best understood 
as efforts to minimize non-performance costs …” Defining a derivative as a promise with a 
default option is crucial in historical research because differences in legal institutions and 
customs created wide disparities in non-performance costs across places and time.    5
Derivative contracts emerged as soon as humans were able to make credible promises. In a 
commercial environment, it is essential for a credible promise that it is somehow recorded. 
Writing was invented in Mesopotamia in the fourth millennium BC. The invention of writing 
satisfied the administrative and commercial needs of the first urban society in human history. The 
first derivative contracts were written in cuneiform script on clay tablets, which, luckily for 
financial historians, are extremely durable. These derivatives were contracts for future delivery of 
goods that were often combined with a loan. Van de Mieroop (2005) reproduces a tablet in which 
a supplier of wood, whose name was Akshak-shemi, promised to deliver 30 wooden [planks?] to 
a client, called Damqanum, at a future date. The contract was written in the nineteenth century 
BC.  
“Thirty wooden [planks?], ten of 3.5 meters each, twenty of 4 meters each, in the month 
Magrattum Akshak-shemi will give to Damqanum. Before six witnesses (their names are listed). 
The year that the golden throne of Sin of Warhum was made.” (van de Mieroop 2005, p. 23) 
 
Swan (2000, p. 28) displays a tablet from about 1700 BC, in which two farmers received 
from the King’s daughter three kurru of barley, which had to be returned at harvest time. The 
farmers, who were brothers, probably used the barely, about 0.9 cubic meters
1, as seed stock for 
planting a field.   
“Three kurru of barley, in the seah-measure of Shamash, the mesheque measure, in storage, 
Anum-pisha and Namran-sharur, the sons of Siniddianam, have received from the naditu-
priestess Iltani, the King’s daughter. At harvest time they will return the three gur of barley in the 
seah-measure of Shamash, the mesheque measure, to the storage container from which they took 
it. Before (two witnesses whose names are listed). Month Ulul, 19th day, year in which King 
Abieshuh completed the statue of Entemena as god.” (Swan 2000, p. 28) 
 
This contract may either be viewed as a commodity loan or as a short-selling operation, in 
which the brothers borrowed barley, used it for planting the crop, and then returned it after 
harvest. This operation was less innocuous than it looks because the brothers carried some risk. If 
                                                 
1 In the second millennium BC and earlier, one kurru (kur, gur) was 300 qa, where one qa was 
about one liter (Segrè 1944).    6
the crop failed they were required to buy barley in order to be able to return it to the royal 
granary. This operation would not have been possible without the sophisticated Mesopotamian 
irrigation system, which reduced the risk of crop failure due to drought. It is also possible that the 
King’s daughter, who represented the state, did not enforce the contract if a widespread crop 
failure due to climatic conditions or a locust plague led to famine. In that case the state carried the 
risk of general crop failure.   
Derivatives played an important role in the funding of long-distance trade. Zohary and Hopf 
(2000, pp. 140-141) maintain that the sesame plant was cultivated in the Indus Valley between 
2250 and 1750 BC. The following tablet, which is from 1809 BC, shows that a Mesopotamian 
merchant borrowed silver, promising to repay it with sesame seeds “according to the going rate” 
after six months. He may have used the silver to finance a trading mission to the Indus Valley to 
obtain sesame seeds. This contract combines a silver loan with a forward sale of sesame seeds.  
“Six shekels silver as a šu-lá loan, Abuwaqar, the son of Ibqu-Erra, received from 
Balnumamhe. In the sixth month he will repay it with sesame according to the going rate. Before 
seven witnesses (their names are listed). These are the witnesses to the seal. In month eleven of 
the year when king Rim-Sin defeated the armies of Uruk, Isin, Babylon, Rapiqum and Sutium, 
and Irdanene, king of Uruk.” (van de Mieroop 2005, pp. 21-22) 
 
While six shekels of silver was a fair amount of money, it seems not to be enough to finance 
a trading mission from Mesopotamia to the Indus Valley.
2 But the merchant probably traded in a 
range of goods. Therefore, he may have concluded similar contracts for other goods to attract 
more funding. 
It is a tragic fact that slave trade was prevalent during much of commercial history. A tablet 
from 1750 BC provided a slave trader with funding and insurance. At the time when the contract 
                                                 
2 Around 1800 BC, the price of a slave was about 24 shekels, the wage of a hired worker was one 
third of a shekel per month, and it cost one to three shekels to rent a house for a year (Source: 
Farber 1978). The Eshnunna Code, which was written ca. 2000 BC, stipulated a monthly wage of 
one shekel.  
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was written, he received 204 2/3 qu of oil in the measure of Shamash. In return, he had to deliver 
healthy slaves from Gutium after one month, with an option of paying 1/3 mina 2/3 shekels of 
silver instead of delivering slaves.  
“204 2/3 qu of oil in the measure of Shamash, to the value of 1/3 mina 2/3 shekels of silver, 
as the price for healthy slaves from Gutium, Warad-Marduk son of Ibni-Marduk has received 
from Utul-Ishtar the troop-commander on the authority of Lu-Ishurra son of Ili-usati. Within one 
month he shall bring healthy slaves from Gutium. If he does not bring them within one month, 
Lu-Ish(k)urra son of Ili-usati will repay 1/3 mina 2/3 shekels of silver to the bearer of this tablet. 
Before (four witnesses whose names are listed). Month Ab, sixth day, year in which King 
Ammisaduqa, etc.” (Swan 2000, p. 29) 
 
This contract provided the slave trader with capital to procure slaves from Gutium. The 
option to pay 1/3 mina 2/3 shekels of silver limited his loss if he was not able to buy slaves at a 
price that made the transaction profitable. It also provided insurance against all other hazards of 
the slave trade, including the risk that the slaves fell ill, they ran away, etc. The counterparty 
agreed to this transaction if the price of 1/3 mina 2/3 shekels of silver for 204 2/3 qu of oil 
exceeded the spot price of oil by an amount that was sufficient to adequately compensate for 
supplying the initial loan of oil and for the risks inherent in the slave trade. The cuneiform tablet 
gave the slave trader the option to pay silver to the bearer of the tablet. This suggests that the 
holder of the tablet could transfer the contract to a third party. But not enough is known on 
Mesopotamian trading practices to determine the significance of the transfer of tablets.  
About half a million clay tablets have been found so far, with more than 200,000 being held 
by the British Museum. The cuneiform digital library initiative (cdli), which is a joint effort of the 
Vorderasiatisches Museum Berlin, the Max Planck Institute for the History of Science and the 
University of California at Los Angeles, has digitalized about 225,000 tablets, making them 
available on the internet and supplying translations and comments.
3 This provides a research 
opportunity for economists who are interested in the history of economic institutions. An 
                                                 
3 The addresses are: http://cdli.mpiwg-berlin.mpg.de and http://cdli.ucla.edu.   8
important economic institution that determines economic outcomes is the market itself. The 
evolution of markets reflects changing transaction and information costs, which depend on 
technological advances in transport, information processing and administration. The emergence 
of contracts for future delivery enhanced the efficiency of agricultural markets in Mesopotamia 
and they were a prerequisite for the expansion of long-distance trade.  
The ascendancy of Greek civilization began around 1000 BC. It is more difficult to 
document the use of derivatives for Greek commerce than Mesopotamia. Greek philosophers and 
historians, whose writings profoundly influenced Western civilization, were not interested in 
commerce. The Greek did not use a medium for commercial contracts that was as durable as clay 
tablets, and laws that have survived as inscriptions on murals and columns were generally hostile 
to contracts for the future delivery of goods. But it is hard to imagine that farmers were able to 
fully fund the crop cycle, and merchants had enough capital to finance risky commercial 
expeditions, while rich individuals found no way to invest their wealth in commercial endeavors 
that promised a return in the future. The fact that Greek law favored spot transactions does not 
prove that there were no contracts for future delivery because commercial history is littered with 
laws and ordinances against derivatives that were ignored by the public. In fact, the Greek were 
quite practical in commercial affairs. According to Swan (2000, p. 61), Athens allowed contracts 
for future delivery in sea-borne trade because the city depended on the import of grain from 
Egypt. Alexander, who invaded the Middle East in the fourth century BC, left the local 
commercial and legal system intact, which had descended from Mesopotamia. Therefore, the use 
of derivatives continued in the Middle East under Greek dominance. Hellenistic Egypt is the 
second period in commercial history from which a large number of commercial contracts has 
survived because papyrus is almost as durable in the desert climate of Egypt as the earlier clay 
tablets.   9
The Romans, who copied much of Greek culture, initially adopted the Greek restrictions on 
contracts for future delivery. But these restrictions clashed with the commercial realities of the 
vast Roman Empire, which reached from Britannia to Mesopotamia at its peak. Commodities 
moved along a network of new roads and the ships of Roman merchants criss-crossed the 
Mediterranean. The city of Rome, whose population grew to one million people, depended on 
trade with the provinces, particularly the import of wheat from Northern Africa. During the third 
century BC, Roman law caught up with commercial practice, providing for contracts for future 
delivery of goods. Swan (2000, Chapter 3.2) considers the treatment of contracts for future 
delivery in Roman law. Sextus Pomponius, a lawyer who wrote in the second century AD, 
distinguished between two types of contracts. The first, vendito re speratae, which was void if the 
seller did not have the goods at the delivery date, provided insurance against crop loss and the 
hazards of long-distance trade, including the loss of ships in maritime trade. The second, vendito 
spei, was a straightforward forward contract that did not provide for any reprieve to the seller in 
case he was unable to deliver the goods. It is unclear whether vendito re speratae involved the 
same rights as a modern put option because the seller may have been obliged to deliver the goods 
if he had them.  
Early Roman law upheld the principle of privity of contract, which implies that a contract 
establishes a relationship that is exclusive to the parties in the contract. A contract was not 
transferable because a third party was unable to enforce it. For example, a credit contract 
established an exclusive relationship between lender and borrower. The lender could not assign 
his right to repayment of principal and interest to someone else because the borrower was only 
obliged to pay to the initial lender. Similarly, the holder of a contract for future delivery could not 
sell it because only the holder was entitled to receive goods in the future, and no one else. The 
principle of privity of contract held back the emergence of security markets in the Roman 
economy. According to Swan (2000, pp. 80-81), the principle of privity of contract eroded only   10
slowly in a legal process that lasted until the end of the Roman Empire. The legal codes of the 
East Roman Emperor Theodosius II (401-450) and Byzantine Emperor Justinian (482/83-565) 
suggest that Rome had developed a law of assignment, which made it possible to trade 
derivatives over-the-counter after they had been written.  
There were no corporations in Roman times, with one notable exception that is documented 
by Malmendier (2005). Societas publicanorum, which were private companies that tendered for 
government contracts, issued shares that were widely held by Romans. Cicero, who lived from 
106 to 43 BC, commented on the trade in these shares, which is said to have taken place near the 
Temple of Castor on the Forum Romanum. The trade in these shares indicates some erosion of 
the principle of privity of contract. The fact that the subscriber to a share could sell it implies that 
there existed no exclusive relationship between the subscriber and the company. Malmendier 
(2005) avoids taking a position “on how much of a stock market there was in ancient Rome”, and 
there is no evidence for or against the view that derivatives were written on the shares of societas. 
The available sources only support the conclusion that Roman derivatives included contracts for 
future delivery of goods that initially were held until the delivery date and that were traded over-
the-counter after some unknown date.  
The barbarian tribes that overran the Roman Empire lacked commercial codes. Instead, 
Church bodies, which had increasingly assumed administrative functions in the late Roman 
Empire, continued to apply Roman commercial law during the Dark Ages. Thus, the legal 
framework for contracts for future delivery remained in place during the Dark Ages, but there 
was no further progress in the design of derivatives because there was not much need for them in 
the Medieval economy which was both local and feudal.   
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2. Derivative Markets During the Renaissance 
Security markets emerged during the Renaissance, a period of cultural and economic revival 
that lasted from the fourteenth to the seventeenth century. During the Renaissance, the Italian city 
states and the Low Countries were the economically most advanced regions in Europe. In the 
twelfth century, Italian cities began to issue so-called monti shares. By the thirteenth century, 
monti shares had become negotiable, making them tradable in secondary markets. Pezzolo (2005) 
provides a detailed account of the finances of Italian cities and their use of monti shares. Monti 
shares were the first securities that were traded in secondary markets. They were followed by 
bills of exchange, which provided the medium of exchange in long-distance trade from the 
fifteenth century until the early twentieth century. The buyer of some commodity accepted a bill 
of exchange and passed it to the payee instead of sending gold or silver coins. The payee either 
held on to the bill until maturity or he sold it to a third party. In fact, bills of exchange, whose 
maturity typically ranged from a few days to 90 days, could pass through many hands. The holder 
of a bill earned interest because bills were traded at a discount that gradually diminished until 
maturity. The domestic currency price of foreign bills of exchange was the exchange rate.  
The main trading centers in northern Europe were Bruges from the twelfth to the fifteenth 
century, Antwerp in the sixteenth century, and Amsterdam in the seventeenth century. Bruges 
was a center for the trade of wool, cloth and other commodities. Around 1540, Antwerp legalized 
the negotiability of bills of exchange and a royal decree made contracts for future delivery 
transferable to third parties. At about this time, an important innovation occurred in derivative 
markets. Merchants discovered that there is no need to settle forward contracts by delivering the 
underlying asset, as it is sufficient if the losing party compensates the winning party for the 
difference between the delivery price and the spot price at the time of settlement. Contracts for 
differences were written on bills of exchange, government bonds and commodities. Although it is   12
likely that similar deals had been done in Bruges and with monti shares in Italy, contracts for 
differences were used on a large scale for the first time in Antwerp.   
The following quote by Cristobal de Villalon (1542) refers to a contract for differences on 
bills of exchange, which was settled by a cash flow that depended on the exchange rate between 
bills of exchange in Antwerp and Spain.
4 Note that the author was accustomed to contracts for 
future delivery in marine insurance, the Roman vendito re speratae.   
“Of late in Flanders a horrible thing has arisen, a kind of cruel tyranny which the merchants 
there have invented among themselves. They wager among themselves on the rate of exchange in 
Spanish fairs at Antwerp. They call these wagers parturas according to the former manner of 
winning money at a birth (parto) when a man wagers whether the child shall be a boy or a girl. In 
Castile this business is called apuestas, wagers. One wagers that the exchange rate shall be at 2 
per cent., premium or discount, another at 3 per cent., etc. They promise each other, to pay the 
difference in accordance with the result. This sort of wager seems to me to be like Marine 
Insurance business. If they are loyally undertaken and discharged, there is nought to be said 
against them. But there are many ruinous tricks practiced therein. … This is a great sin.” 
(Cristobal de Villalon 1542. Quoted in Ehrenberg 1928, pp. 243-244) 
 
Contracts for differences were precursors of modern futures contracts. Like contracts for 
differences, futures contracts are usually settled by paying the difference between the delivery 
price and the spot price of the underlying asset, instead of delivering the asset itself. But futures 
have some safeguards that contracts for differences did not posses. Both parties in a futures 
contract must maintain a margin account into which some money must be paid upfront. At the 
end of each business day, the value of a futures contract is reset to zero by crediting and debiting 
the change in value that had occurred during the day to the margin accounts. In fact, a futures 
contract is settled incrementally by daily cash flows between the margin accounts of both parties. 
If the balance of a margin account falls below some minimum value, there is a margin call and 
the account holder must provide new funds. The use of margin accounts with daily cash flows 
reduces the counterparty risk of futures contracts because daily price changes are smaller than 
                                                 
4 Cristobal (Christoval) de Villalon was a Spanish humanist.     13
cumulated price changes over long periods of time. Contracts for differences were less secure 
because they were settled by a single, potentially much larger cash flow at some distant date. 
After the sack of Antwerp by Spanish troops in 1576, Amsterdam became the leading 
commercial center in northern Europe. Amsterdam had a cosmopolitan population with Calvinist 
fugitives from Antwerp and Jews who were harassed by the Catholic Church in Spain and 
Portugal. The Golden Age of Amsterdam lasted for about 80 years, from 1585 until the mid-
seventeenth century. Dutch merchants dealt in a wide range of staples that were imported from 
Italy, the Baltic, the West Indies (Caribbean) and the East Indies (South East Asia). The financial 
needs of maritime trade created a supply of forward contracts and securities, including bills of 
exchange and shares of joint-stock companies. The Dutch East India Company and the Dutch 
West India Company, which were founded in 1602 and 1621, were the first large enterprises that 
issued shares as a source of funds. Right from the beginning, share trading involved contracts for 
differences. In an essay on the speculative activities of Isaac Le Maire (1558-1624), van Dillen 
(1935, pp. 53, 58) noted that shares were traded “on term” (for future delivery): “… shares sold 
not only for cash but also on term. This wasn’t anything new in Amsterdam, since term sales had 
been the custom for trade in wheat and herring.” He also found that forward contracts on shares 
were usually settled as contracts for differences: “Instead of delivering the shares, people were 
content most often to pay the surplus, the difference between trading rates, which had to be 
settled later.” Amsterdam was the first city where derivatives that were based on securities were 
used freely for a long period of time. 
The foundation of the Dutch East India Company was met with public enthusiasm, which 
turned into disenchantment when the Company developed more slowly than expected. The share 
price doubled within a few years, but about one half to three quarters of this gain was lost by 
1610 (Neal 2005). Reacting to the disappointing performance of the Dutch East India Company, 
Isaac Le Maire, a fugitive from Antwerp, conducted the first recorded bear attack on an   14
underperforming firm by selling its shares short. Thus, he borrowed shares and he then sold the 
borrowed shares. This was profitable if he could buy the shares back and return them to the 
owner at a lower price in the future. Conceptually, there is no big step from a contract for 
differences to a short-selling operation. In a contract for differences the expected profit depends 
on the difference between the expected future spot price and the delivery price. In a short-selling 
operation the expected profit is determined by the difference between the expected future spot 
price and the current spot price.  
Short-selling attracts public scorn when prices are falling because it is thought that it creates 
an extra supply of the asset that further depresses prices. In Amsterdam short-selling was banned 
in 1610. Yet, Kellenbenz (1957, p. xiv) is right that restrictions on short-selling were difficult to 
enforce. The ban on short-selling was ineffective because it was impractical to determine whether 
a seller indeed owned the asset to be sold or whether the asset was borrowed. It is hard to imagine 
how the authorities could have ascertained the ownership of every commodity and financial 
instrument that was sold in Amsterdam, without severely interfering with the operation of 
markets. Amsterdam would not have become the foremost merchant city in northern Europe with 
such stifling controls.   
In the mid-seventeenth century, Amsterdam became entangled in wars with France and 
England and the plague decimated the city’s population. Toward the end of the century, a 
renewed influx of religious fugitives contributed to the city’s recovery. Large numbers of 
Huguenots - French Protestants - moved to Holland and Switzerland after the Edict of 
Fontainebleau in 1685. It is estimated that by the end of the century, Huguenots accounted for 20 
to 25 percent of Amsterdam’s population. Financial services contributed much to the revival of 
the city in the late seventeenth century. Commodity trade, however, moved to London because 
England now dominated maritime trade.    15
In 1688, Joseph de la Vega (1650-1692?) wrote a book on stock trading in Amsterdam, 
which he gave the suggestive title Confusion de Confusiones. In the introduction to the English 
translation, Hermann Kellenbenz, remarks that it “is a book written in Spanish by a Portuguese 
Jew, published in Amsterdam, cast in dialogue form [used by Greek philosophers], embellished 
from start to finish with biblical, historical and mythological allusions, and yet concerned 
primarily with the stock exchange ...” De la Vega’s work has been translated into several 
languages and a new Spanish edition was published in 1997; Cardoso (2006) includes a complete 
list of references. De la Vega was fascinated by options, which he considered to be safer than 
contracts for differences. At the beginning of his treatise, he notes that a long forward contract 
can be settled in three ways: 
“First there is the sale of the shares, through which profit or loss will arise according to the 
purchase price; then there is the hypothecation of the shares to four-fifths of their value (which is 
done even by the wealthiest traders without harm to their credit); and, finally, the buyer may have 
the shares transferred to his name and make the purchase price payable at the Bank - which can 
be done only by very wealthy people, because a “regiment” [the standard notional value of a 
forward contract] today costs more than a hundred thousand ducats.” (de la Vega 1688, pp. 5-6)    
 
This quote implies that forward contracts were contracts for differences. The holder of a long 
forward contract usually did not take delivery of the underlying shares because the notional value 
of a contract was extremely high, a hundred thousand ducats (3290.75 kilograms of silver).
5 If the 
holder took delivery, he could pay for the shares by borrowing up to four-fifth of their value, 
using the shares as collateral (hypothecation). This was done if settling for the difference 
produced a large loss that would have inconvenienced the holder of the contract. Thus, the first 
method of settling a long forward contract - the sale of the shares - amounted to settling for the 
difference; and the second method - hypothecation - was a way out if settling for the difference 
                                                 
5 In 1702, one Dutch ducat was 21.16 pennyweights (dwt) of silver, where one pennyweight is 
1.555174 grams. Thus, one ducat was 32.91 grams of silver. The letter d in dwt stands for penny 
(denarius), as in the traditional notation for pound/shilling/pence, £/s/d. (McCusker 1978, Table 
1.1.) 
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would bankrupt the holder of the contract; whereas the third method - taking delivery of the 
shares - was only practical for rich investors. Forward contracts are risky because the delivery 
price can differ by a large amount from the spot price at settlement. Therefore, de la Vega (1688) 
favored options, which he considered new instruments for speculation that were safer than 
contracts for differences.    
“The price of the shares is now 580, [and let us assume that] it seems to me that they will 
climb to a much higher price because … of the good business of the Company … of the 
prospective dividends ... Nevertheless, I decide not to buy shares through fear that I might 
encounter a loss and meet with embarrassment if my calculations should prove erroneous. I 
therefore turn to the persons who are willing to take [write] options and ask them how much 
premium they demand for the obligation to deliver shares at 600 each at a certain later date. I 
come to an agreement about the premium, have it transferred [to the writer of the options] 
immediately at the Bank, and then I am sure that it is impossible to lose more than the price of the 
premium. And I shall gain the entire amount by which the price [of the stock] shall surpass the 
figure of 600 … In the case of a decline, however, I need not be afraid and disturbed …” (de la 
Vega 1688, p. 8) 
 
After this description of a call option, de la Vega (1688) turns to put options: 
 “… I can do the same business (in reverse), if I reckon upon a decline in the price of the 
stock. I now pay premiums for the right to deliver stock at a given price …” (de la Vega 1688, p. 
8) 
 
Finally, he summarizes the option business: 
“The Dutch call the option business “opsies,” a term derived from the Latin word optio, 
which means choice, because the payer of the premium has the choice of delivering the shares to 
the acceptor of the premium or demanding them from him, [respectively].” (de la Vega 1688, p. 
9) 
 
De la Vega may have looked for a less risky method of speculation because Amsterdam had 
experienced the first recorded financial bubble, the tulipmania, about half a century before he 
wrote his book. 
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3. The Tulipmania 
Carolus Clusius, an Austrian botanist, who became head of the Botanical Garden in Leiden 
in the 1590s, introduced tulips in Holland. Tulips, which belong to the indigenous flora of 
Turkey, quickly became fashionable among the affluent. During a speculative frenzy in 1636-37, 
some bulbs are said to have been traded at a price equal to the value of a house. The traditional 
view of the tulipmania, which has been put forward by Mackay (1852), Kindleberger (1996) and 
others, is that it was a speculative bubble during which the public behaved irrationally. Garber 
(1989, 2000) and Goldgar (2007) cast doubt on this interpretation, arguing that earlier authors 
exaggerated prices rises and that it was not irrational to invest in tulip bulbs. French (2006) 
argues that monetary factors created the right conditions for an asset price bubble in Amsterdam 
in the 1630s.   
The speculation with tulip bulbs was done with contracts for differences, and possibly 
options. By the time of the tulipmania, contracts for differences had been used in Holland for 
about a century. It is unlikely that speculators were wealthy enough to buy tulip bulbs and hold 
on to them. Indeed, contracts for differences were controversial because they gave people 
leverage to speculate. In Antwerp contracts for differences were outlawed shortly after forward 
contracts had been made transferable, around 1541 (Swan 2000, p. 144). But it is unlikely that 
this restriction was effective because a forward contract does not show how it will be settled. 
Even if the contract requires the delivery of the underlying asset, the parties to the contract can 
informally agree on a cash payment at the delivery date. In Amsterdam contracts for differences 
were not made illegal, instead, in 1621, 1630 and 1636, three edicts were issued with the 
intention to undermine contracts for differences by making them unenforceable in the courts 
(Kellenbenz 1957, p. xiv). However, these edicts did not prevent the use of contracts for 
differences during the tulipmania. Derivative markets continued to work because the failure to 
honor a contract made a speculator an outcast, practically excluding him from further dealings.   18
The following quote from de la Vega (1688) shows that most people valued their 
credit(worthiness) and reputation, although his friend did not fit the norm: 
“There are many persons who refer to the decree [which proclaims the unenforceability of 
short sales] only when compelled to do so, I mean only if unforeseen losses occur to them in their 
operations. Other people gradually fulfill their obligations after having sold their last valuables 
and thus meet with punctuality the reverses of misfortune. But I also knew a friend, a strange 
man, who recovered from the grief of his loss by pacing up and down in his house, not in order to 
wake up the dead like Elias, but to bury the living. And after half an hour of such soliloquies he 
uttered five or six sighs in a tone which betrayed more his relief than his despair. When asked the 
reason for his joy, which pointed to some sort of compromise that he had come to with his 
creditors, he answered, “On the contrary, just this moment I have made up my mind not to pay at 
all, since my peace of mind and my advantage mean more to me than my credit and my honour.”” 
(de la Vega 1688, p. 7)    
 
In Amsterdam derivative trading was based on reputation because personal business 
relationships were important in a city whose population grew from about 50,000 to 200,000 
people during the seventeenth century.  
A consequence of the absence of legal enforcement of derivative contracts was that they 
were traded only over-the-counter. The default risk of derivative contracts was idiosyncratic 
because it depended on how strongly people valued their “peace of mind” and their “advantage”. 
In addition, the edicts of 1621, 1630 and 1637 were ambiguous, leading to some court cases. For 
this reason, in Amsterdam contracts for differences did not evolve into futures contracts that were 
traded anonymously at exchanges, and options did not become warrants. The absence of legal 
enforcement of derivative contracts may also explain why the tulipmania did not lead to a strong 
economic recession. Since holders of long forward contracts had the right to repudiate them, there 
were no widespread bankruptcies when the price of tulips collapsed in 1637. The history of the 
tulipmania suggests that in derivative markets a moratorium is preferable if enforcing contracts 
would cause widespread ruin and a recession.  
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4. Great Britain and France in the Eighteenth Century 
The development of English financial markets lagged behind continental Europe by about 
two centuries. During the sixteenth century, England was still a rural-agricultural country that 
lacked the dynamism of the urban Italian and Dutch societies. In the seventeenth century, the 
country was held back by political strife, which culminated in the Civil War of 1642-1651. Since 
Parliament withheld funding, the King financed a floating (short-term) debt by imposing 
compulsory loans and borrowing from a motley crew of money dealers, gold smiths and bankers. 
English public finances were a shambles, preventing a market for government debt in the 
seventeenth century. The political turmoil also retarded the evolution of commercial law. Swan 
(2000, p. 171) found a court case that indicates that the negotiability of bills of exchange was a 
matter of contention as late as 1736, two hundred years after bills of exchange had become 
negotiable in the Low Countries. Finally, the shares of joint-stock companies did not play a 
significant role until the 1690s, although the first joint-stock companies had emerged in England 
at about the same time as in Amsterdam. The Royal Exchange, which had been established by Sir 
Thomas Gresham in the 1560s, was a commodity exchange.   
In the Revolution of 1688, a group of Parliamentarians offered the crown jointly to Mary and 
her husband William of Orange, both grandchildren of James I of England. The couple lived in 
Holland where William held the office of Stadtholder. The move of William and Mary from 
Amsterdam to London had a profound impact on English society. Parliamentary rule was 
strengthened, setting England on course toward a constitutional monarchy. Jardine (2008) 
portrays how the English benefited from the administrative, commercial and scientific 
achievements of the Dutch. Public finances were reformed, leading to the establishment of the 
Bank of England in 1694 and the introduction of Exchequer (Treasury) bills in 1696. The Bank of 
England, which celebrated its Dutch heritage in 2002, discounted bills of exchange and 
Exchequer bills. By buying Exchequer bills, the Bank monetized the floating public debt. These   20
financial reforms gave rise to a money market in which bills of exchange and Exchequer bills 
were traded. At the same time, there were improvements in the capital market. In the 1690s, a 
large number of joint-stock companies was founded whose shares were traded in the stock 
market, using the same techniques as in Amsterdam. Gerderblom and Jonker (2005) conclude 
“the financiers following William [of Orange] to Britain possessed a full range of financial 
techniques, and for which they found a ready market indeed. This transfer of knowledge formed 
the basis of derivatives trading in London, firmly linking Amsterdam’s pioneering work to the 
emergence of modern markets.” 
After the successful financial reforms in the 1690s, the British government blundered when 
it took part in the creation of the South Sea Company in 1711. The South Sea Company was given 
the exclusive right to trade with South America (not the South Pacific), including the slave trade 
between Africa and South America. This right turned out to be illusory because Spain restricted 
trade between South America and Great Britain to a single ship per year in the Treaty of Utrecht 
in 1713, and even the slave trade was not profitable for the Company because local agents 
siphoned off large sums of money. Instead, the South Sea Company became a vehicle for the 
financing of long-term government debt, which may have been the government’s intention all 
along. The Company issued shares and it bought long-term government bonds, which were 
inadmissible for discounting at the Bank of England. This was an unattractive business because 
the shareholders could buy government bonds directly. The idea seems to have been that the Bank 
of England would control the money market and the South Sea Company would dominate the 
capital market.  
The combination of a colonial trading monopoly with public finances proved to be a disaster, 
leading to the South Sea bubble in 1719. Exaggerated expectations of future returns from trade 
with South America drove the share prices far above the value of government bonds held by the 
Company. Dale et al. (2005) find evidence for irrational behavior. It seemed that the South Sea   21
Company had achieved the impossible, funding the long-term government debt and, at the same 
time, enriching shareholders by issuing shares whose value rose above the funded government 
debt. The success of the South Sea Company led to a wave of new joint-stock companies with 
dubious business plans, which tried to cash in on the public’s seemingly insatiable appetite for 
shares. In April 1720, shortly before the South Sea bubble burst, the government restricted the 
establishment of new joint-stock companies. The limitation on new joint-stock companies, which 
remained in force until 1825, was a futile attempt to support the price of the shares of the South 
Sea Company by reducing the overall supply of shares.  
During the South Sea bubble, the tools of speculation included call and put options, where 
the former were called “refusals”. In addition, there was an innovation, a warrant-like instrument. 
The South Sea Company issued partially paid shares that subscribers could buy by making several 
installment payments. Shea (2007) maintains that these shares were compound call options 
because the payment of an installment gave the subscriber the right to pay the next installment, 
thus keeping alive the option to eventually own the share. If the share price fell below a certain 
value, the subscriber could refuse to make the next installment payment, forfeiting the option on 
the shares. The partially paid shares of the South Sea Company were warrants because the 
privileged position of the South Sea Company made them so fungible that they were 
anonymously traded in a secondary market.  
The economic aftermath of the South Sea bubble remains contentious. Schumpeter (1939, 
pp. 250-251) claims that there was no major economic downturn after the South Sea bubble, but 
Carswell (1960) argues that the bubble had severe economic repercussions, delaying the onset of 
the Industrial Revolution by almost half a century. Kindleberger (1984, pp. 282-283, and 1996, p. 
191), who avoids taking a position on the economic consequences of the South Sea bubble, notes 
that “London stopped growing from 1720 to 1750”. There is reason to believe that the economic 
downturn after the South Sea bubble was more severe than after the tulipmania. Unlike in   22
Amsterdam, speculators could not easily abandon a contract. The more rigorous enforcement of 
financial contracts in Great Britain led to bankruptcies when the bubble burst. To avoid the worst, 
the Bank of England belatedly and “grudgingly” baled out the South Sea Company (Kindleberger 
1984, p. 282).  
In 1734, the British Parliament passed the Sir John Barnard’s Act, which declared contracts 
for the future delivery of securities to be “null and void”. Fines amounted to £500 for “refusals” 
and “putts” and £100 for short-selling operations. The Act applied only to derivatives on 
securities because, as debated in Parliament, it was feared that commodity markets would move 
back to Amsterdam if contracts for the future delivery of commodities were outlawed in London. 
Adam Smith (1766) realized that the Sir John Barnard’s Act did not prevent derivative dealings 
in security markets.   
“This practice of buying stock by time is prohibited by the government, and accordingly, 
tho’ they should not deliver up the stocks they have engaged for, the law gives no redress.   
There is no natural reason why 1000 £ in stocks should not be delivered or the delivery of it 
enforced, as well as 1000 £ worth of goods. But after the South Sea scheme this was thought 
upon as an expedient to prevent such practices, tho’ it proved ineffectual. In the same manner all 
laws against gaming never hinder it, and tho’ no redress for a sum above 5 £, yet all the great 
sums that are lost are punctually paid. Persons who game must keep their credit, else no body will 
deal with them. It is quite the same in stock jobbing. They who do not keep their credit will soon 
be turned out, and in the language of Change Alley be called a lame duck. (Smith 1766, pp. 537-
538.) 
 
The Sir John Barnard’s Act made derivative contracts on securities unenforceable in the 
courts. As a consequence, Great Britain moved to a system of derivative trading with securities 
that was based on reputation, similar to that in Amsterdam a century earlier. The restriction on 
derivatives that involved securities explains why shares were traded in the Exchange Alley and 
not at the Royal Exchange. Share trading took place in the Exchange Alley because derivatives on 
securities were illegal. Thus, share traders were not banished from “the august surroundings of 
the second Royal Exchange” to “the shady precincts of Exchange Alley and nearby coffee 
houses”, as maintained by Swan (2000, pp. 188-189). Instead, share traders avoided the Royal   23
Exchange because they could not deal with options and conduct short-selling operations in the 
open. Commodity traders, however, stayed at the Royal Exchange because there were no 
restrictions on contracts for the future delivery of commodities.  
The South Sea bubble was the first financial crisis with an international scope. In Paris, the 
shares of the Compagnie des Indes, which had absorbed the Mississippi Company and the Banque 
Royale in 1719, were even more prone to speculation than those of the South Sea Company. Like 
its British counterpart, the French company possessed a colonial trading monopoly and it funded 
the Royal treasury by issuing shares. In addition, the French company discounted bills of 
exchange and it issued bank notes, the business that was assigned to the Bank of England in 
London. The Compagnie des Indes was the brain child of John Law (1671-1729), who had fled 
Scotland after being sentenced to death in 1694 for killing an adversary in a duel. Niehans (1990, 
p. 48) opined that Law “became influential for classical monetary theory in two respects, (1) by 
being the first to assign paper money an important economic role, and (2) by providing a 
dramatic example for the disasters that may result from the failure to have a correct 
understanding of this role.” Law put forward the “real-bills doctrine”, which, as discussed in 
Niehans (1990, pp. 48-51) and Weber (2003), does not provide an effective constraint on the 
issue of paper money. Murphy (2006) provides an introduction to Law’s monetary and financial 
innovations. The price of shares of the Compagnie des Indes rose about 20-fold, whereas the 
shares of the South Sea Company rose only about six to seven-fold. Speculation was more intense 
in Paris than in London because unrealistic expectations on the prospects of colonial trade were 
reinforced by an inflationary overissue of paper money. After the collapse of the bubble in 1720, 
Law, who had been appointed as French finance minister a few months earlier, fled the country, 
spending his final years as an impoverished gambler in Venice. The timing of the collapse in 
share prices - May in Paris and September in London - suggests that the panic spread from Paris   24
to London. Kindleberger (1996, pp. 111-112) indicates that other financial centers were affected, 
including Amsterdam and Hamburg. 
Coffinière (1824, pp. 1-50) reviewed the restrictions on derivative trading that were imposed 
in the wake of the financial collapse in Paris. On August 30, 1720, the State Council stripped the 
privilege to deal in financial markets from the sixty security dealers. Over the next five years, a 
series of laws and ordinances established a stock exchange with first twenty and then again sixty 
authorized dealers. The purpose of the French legislation was to confine security and commodity 
dealings to the premises of the stock exchange in order to control activities. This is just what 
share traders in London feared the most, to be forced to work at the Royal Exchange. Article 17 
of a State Council Decision of September 24, 1724, restricted all dealings in securities and 
commodities to the privileged dealers “in order to prevent short-sales”. Despite the threat of 
heavy fines, unauthorized people visited the stock exchange, trading took place outside the 
exchange building in some restaurants, and deals for future delivery were common. In 1736, a 
policy order banned thirty persons from the stock exchange, imposing a fine of 6000 livres on 
each.  
The French Revolution, which upheld the principle of freedom of trade, initially led to the 
abolishment of the guild-like privileges of the authorized dealers, but the Commercial Code of 
1807 and supporting legislation returned to a regulatory framework that was virtually 
indistinguishable to that of the preceding century. Dealings in securities and commodities were 
again restricted to authorized dealers at the stock exchange. Article 321 and 422 of the Penal 
Code of 1810 imposed fines and prison terms on wagers with government bonds, which were 
contracts for differences. But trading continued outside the stock exchange in some restaurants. 
The preamble to a police order of January 24, 1823, bears witness to the futility of more than a 
century of legislation against derivative trading in Paris. Note that the State Council Decision of 
September 24, 1724, remained in force after the French Revolution.    25
“Since the Police-Prefect has been informed that the laws and ordinances on the stock 
exchange are often circumvented, that many people meet at several places, especially at the 
Tortonic Coffee House, to deal with bills of exchange, money and commodities, interfering 
without authorization with the business of security and commodity dealers; considering that these 
infractions can only be explained by a lack of knowledge of the law or a disregard of it; 
considering Articles 1, 2 and 25 of the Decree of July 1, 1801; - (2) Article 1 of that of March 19, 
1801; - (3) Articles 76, 78, 79, 85, 86, 87, 88 of the Commercial Code; - (4) the State Decisions 
of September 24, 1724 (Article 12) and August 7, 1785 (Article 182); - further considering 
Article 3 of the Government Decision of June 16, 1802; …….” (Coffinière 1824, p. 47. 
Translated by E.J. Weber). 
 
After all these weighty considerations and listing a century of futile legislation, the Police-
Prefect once more outlawed derivatives, and trading in securities and commodities was restricted 
to authorized dealers at the stock exchange - again to no avail. As in Great Britain, derivatives 
continued to be traded informally outside the premises of the exchange, based on reputation with 
no recourse to the court system. This made people more cautious with whom they dealt, and it 
avoided the spread of bankruptcies when there were speculative excesses. In the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, European governments lacked both the will and political power to suppress 
financial transactions between enterprising individuals.  
 
5. Derivative Markets in the Nineteenth Century 
In the early nineteenth century, a wave of derivative trading encompassed France that was 
based on government bonds. After the defeat of Napoleon in 1815, the Allied powers - Great 
Britain, Prussia, Austria and Russia - asked for financial compensation for a quarter of a century 
of war in Europe. Although France had lost the war and there had been a hyperinflation during 
the revolutionary period, the French government gained surprisingly quickly access to domestic 
and international financial markets. This made it possible to pay for the reparations with a mix of 
taxes and borrowing that was politically and economically less damaging than relying on 
exorbitant taxes without borrowing. At the same time, the growth in public debt created a market 
for government bonds, which provided a pool of fungible assets for derivative trading.       26
The remarkable recovery of investor confidence in French public debt was caused by several 
favorable circumstances. After the collapse of the Napoleonic regime, France continued to benefit 
from Napoleon’s monetary and fiscal reforms. Napoleon had stabilized the French currency, 
reforming public finances and establishing the Bank of France. It is a popular myth that Napoleon 
was a fiscal conservative because he did not borrow much. Actually, he found it hard to borrow 
because European banking houses perceived him as a dangerous adventurer with uncertain 
prospects. In any case, Napoleon’s early military campaigns were self-financing because he 
plundered the treasuries of occupied countries. The loot from the city of Bern financed the 
campaign in Egypt, a mode of finance that pained the Bernese aristocrats for some time. White 
(2001) also points to political factors that explain the relatively smooth transition of government 
after Napoleon. The goal of the four Allied powers, all monarchies, was to restore the Bourbon 
monarchy and not to destroy France. Even during the peace negotiations, Great Britain became an 
ally of France against Prussia and Russia, whose territorial claims in Eastern Europe threatened to 
unsettle the balance of power in Europe. Thus, at the end of the Napoleonic Wars, France had a 
stable currency, the public debt was small, the government was accepted as legitimate at least by 
monarchists, and France was supported by Great Britain in the peace negotiations. These 
circumstances were more favorable than those in Germany after World War I.  
White (2001) reckons that the French reparation payments were “in most dimensions 
somewhat smaller than the post-World War I German reparations” but “larger than any other 
nineteenth and twentieth century indemnities.” As a consequence of the reparation payments, the 
French public debt that was funded by long-term bonds rose from 1.3 billion francs in 1814 to 4.2 
billion francs in 1821 (White 2001, Table 4). This made the French public debt the second 
highest in the world, behind Great Britain whose total interest bearing public debt was 570 
million pounds in 1820, or about 14.4 billion francs (Barro 1997, p. 511). The British public debt 
had expanded during the eighteenth century and, unlike Napoleon, the British government had   27
been able to raise funds in the capital market to finance the war effort. Wright (1999) presents 
estimates on British government borrowing during wars from 1750 to 1815.       
In the 1820s, derivative trading with government bonds flourished in Paris. Coffinière (1824) 
and Proudhon (1857) wrote manuals on the techniques of derivative trading and the regulatory 
framework. Proudhon (1857, Chapter V) subdivided contracts for future delivery (négotiations à 
terme) into forward contracts (marchés fermes) and options (marchés à primes, marchés libres). 
A call option is called an “achat à prime” and a put option is a “vente à prime”. He also 
considered repurchase agreements, which were called “reports”. Both manuals were widely read 
but their style is bizarre, albeit for different reasons. Coffinière (1824) expressed moral outrage 
about the uses of contracts for future delivery that were settled by paying differences. He 
emphasized time and again that these activities were illegal because they were tantamount to 
wagers and illegal gambling. The police order against derivative trading, whose preamble was 
cited above, was issued in January 1823. Coffinière, who was an advocate (solicitor), could not 
afford to give the appearance that he supported illegal financial transactions.  
By the time Proudhon (1857) published his manual, derivative trading involved a wide range 
of government bonds and shares. The second part of the manual includes a long list of securities 
that were traded at the Paris Stock Exchange in the 1850s. Yet, the regulatory framework had not 
kept up with the expansion of derivative markets in the first half of the nineteenth century. 
Proudhon (1857, p. 47) noted that the government of Louis-Philippe had put up with derivative 
trading in the Café Tortoni and the Passage de l’Opéra, but the police cleared the Cercle du 
Boulevard des Italiens of derivate traders in 1849 and the Passage de l’Opéra and the Casino in 
1853. The purpose of the police action was to protect the monopoly of the authorized security 
dealers at the stock exchange who earned hefty monopoly rents. Despite the large expansion in 
trading volumes, their number had been frozen at sixty for 150 years! In the mid-1850s, the 
authorities yielded and the stock exchange opened its doors to the public, charging a modest   28
entrance fee. Proudhon (1857, p. 81) also reports that contracts for future delivery were now 
lawful if the delivery date did not exceed two months (one month for railway shares). Hence, 
unlike Coffinière in 1824, Proudhon (1857) felt no need to hide the purpose of his manual, which 
he called “Manuel du Spéculateur à la Bourse”.  
Proudhon’s manual on speculation is unusual because its author hated the stock exchange. In 
1853-54, he had accepted the commission to write the manual because he needed money. The 
first two editions were published anonymously and, only when the success of the book had been 
established, he put his name on the third edition. It was an odd decision by the booksellers MM. 
Garnier frères to ask Proudhon to write a manual on derivative trading. Proudhon was a well 
known social philosopher who had collaborated with Karl Marx until, after falling out with Marx, 
he developed his own brand of anarchistic socialism. Proudhon’s treatment of the contracts for 
future delivery in Chapter V is more succinct than that of Coffinière, whose book he knew 
(Proudhon 1857, p. 61). In his book, Proudhon also made valuable contributions to economic 
theory, anticipating modern information economics. He applied the principal-agent model to the 
conflict of interest between shareholders and management, and he put forward a model of the 
stock market in which noise traders interact with well informed professionals. However, all this 
valuable material is swamped by his polemic against the capitalists and government officials who 
controlled the stock exchange. Despite his tirades against the stock exchange, the book was 
popular because Proudhon, who survived on journalism, was a seductive writer who appealed to a 
base instinct of his readers - envy.  
Between the sixteenth and the eighteenth centuries, in several German cities exchanges 
sprang up for the trade with bills of exchange. Most exchanges served a local clientele, but 
Hamburg maintained links with Amsterdam and the Hanseatic cities in the Baltic in the 
seventeenth century, and Frankfurt gained in importance in the second half of the eighteenth 
century. In the nineteenth century, the development of German security markets followed the   29
same pattern as in France. Bonds of German states were first introduced at exchanges, and shares 
of railways, banks, insurance companies and industrial companies followed later. In 1806 the 
exchange in Berlin started to quote government bonds, two years later 21 government bonds were 
listed. In 1840 shares of three railways were added, and by 1848 there were 44 of them. In the 
second half of the nineteenth century, the number of listed securities grew rapidly: 163 in 1867, 
358 in 1870, 1273 in 1894, and more than 2000 in 1906. In Frankfurt the number of securities 
rose from 20 in 1800 to 1104 in 1900 (all figures are from Schanz 1906).  
Zurich is typical for the development of financial markets in a small city in central Europe. 
In 1850, the exchange rates for bills of exchange from 13 cities and the shares of two banks - the 
Bank in Zürich and the Bank in St. Gallen - were listed in the Tagblatt der Stadt Zürich. Within a 
few years, corporate bonds were introduced at the exchange and the number of shares rose 
markedly. In 1856, the Neue Zürcher Zeitung listed 13 exchange rates, bonds of six railways, and 
shares of eight railways and six banks. Figure 1 reproduces a leaflet published by the 
Schweizerische Kreditanstalt (Credit Suisse) on January 4, 1867, which includes quotes for the 
three categories of securities that were traded at exchanges: bills of exchange (Wechsel) on top, 
bonds (Obligationen) in the middle, and shares (Actien) at the bottom. There were 15 exchange 
rates, 10 bonds, and eight shares of railways and industrial companies. The exchange rates for 
Basel, Genf (Geneva) and St. Gallen were 100, as one would expect with a single currency. Note 
that the exchange rate for Triest, the home of Vinzenz Bronzin, is specially mentioned in the 
table. On September 3, 1869, the first issue of the Wechsel- und Effekten - Cursblatt von Zürich 
includes a bond of the Swiss federal government. In the first half of the nineteenth century, 
government bonds had been unimportant in Switzerland because of the political fragmentation of 
the country. In addition there was an American government bond, and two foreign shares from 
Crédit Lyonnais and Gaze Belge. In 1869, 59 bonds and shares were traded at the exchange in 
Zurich. All listings are reproduced in Schmid and Meier (1977, pp. 61-99).   30
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Derivative trading spread from France to Central Europe. Coffinière’s book was translated 
into German and published in Berlin in 1824, and a sanitized German summary of Proudhon’s 
book was published in Zurich in 1857. The anonymous editor highlighted Proudhon’s concern 
with the precarious position of shareholders, using a new title “The Stock Exchange, Stock 
Exchange Operations and Deceptions, and the Position of Shareholders and the Public”. In 
Germany contracts for future delivery were called “Zeitgeschäfte”, which Emery (1896, p. 46, n. 
2) translated as “time-contracts”.
6 Contracts for future delivery were subdivided into forward 
contracts (fest abgeschlossene Geschäfte, feste Geschäfte, Fixgeschäfte) and options 
(Prämiengeschäfte, Dontgeschäfte). A literal translation of “Prämiengeschäfte” is “premium 
businesses”, which points to the premium that is paid for an option. In France, Switzerland and 
Austria the premium on an option was also called “dont”. The terms for call option (Geschäft mit 
Vorprämie) and put option (Geschäft mit Rückprämie) failed to describe these transactions. This 
was even worse for the positions that can be taken in option markets: long call (Kauf mit 
Vorprämie), short call (Verkauf mit Vorprämie), long put (Verkauf mit Rückprämie) and short 
put (Kauf mit Rückprämie). Therefore, Bronzin (1908) introduced a more intuitive terminology: 
long call (Wahlkauf), short call (Zwangsverkauf), long put (Wahlverkauf) and short put 
(Zwangskauf). In addition, Moser (1875) and Bronzin (1908) mentioned a straddle 
(Stellgeschäfte, Stellagen) and “Nochgeschäfte”. “Noch” means “again”. In a “Wahlkauf mit m-
mal Noch”, an investor at the same time buys a share and m call options on the share. Thus, he 
has the right to buy another m shares in the future. Similarly a “Wahlverkauf mit m-mal Noch” 
combines a sale of a share with m long puts on it.  
By the mid-nineteenth century, many publications on derivatives competed for the public’s 
attention. But these publications were ill-suited as manuals for derivative trading because the 
authors, who often had a background in law, overemphasized regulations that were largely 
                                                 
6 Emery (1896) gives some space to Proudhon (1857) at the beginning of his treatise on futures 
markets in the United States.        32
ineffective, and derivatives were explained with the help of tedious numerical examples. In 
effect, virtually no advance had taken place in the professional discussion of derivatives since de 
la Vega had published Confusion de Confusiones in Amsterdam in 1688. By the mid-nineteenth 
century, the shortcomings of the financial literature held back the development of derivative 
markets. A verbatim discussion of contracts for future delivery stretches the possibilities of 
everyday language, and the use of numerical examples is not suitable for the analysis of 
combinations of derivative contracts. The straddle was discussed as a separate contract because 
the authors did not notice that it combined positions in call and put options, and combinations of 
derivative contracts that produced more complicated payoffs were beyond the reach of the 
financial literature. Cohn (1867, pp. 3 and 36), who became Professor of Economics at the 
Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) in Zurich, still relied on Coffinière (1824) in his doctoral 
dissertation on the difference business.
7     
The invention of profit charts, which occurred around 1870, contributed much to the 
understanding of derivative contracts. Profit charts clarified the nature of forward contracts and 
options and they made it possible to combine derivatives in novel ways, achieving payoffs that 
had hitherto been impossible. The invention of profit charts was a decisive step in the evolution 
of derivative markets. They made it possible to explain a derivative contract with a single graph 
instead of long-winded explanations, numerical example and tables. Both Bachelier (1900) and 
Bronzin (1908) used profit charts in their works. It is unlikely that Bachelier and Bronzin, who 
had studied mathematics and physics, would have turned to the analysis of option pricing if profit 
charts had not provided an easy way for young scientists, who lacked experience in financial 
markets, to learn about derivatives.  
                                                 
7 Gustav Cohn (1840-1919) was a renowned German economist who wrote several books on 
public finance and transportation economics. He completed the doctoral dissertation at the 
University of Leipzig in 1867. From 1875 to 1884, he held the chair of economics at the Federal 
Institute of Technology (ETH) in Zurich, and afterwards he moved to the University of 
Göttingen.   33
The first profit charts were published by Lefèvre (1873) and Moser (1875). Jovanovic 
(2006b) reproduces four charts from Lefèvre (1873): a long forward contract (achat ferme), a 
long call option (achat à prime dont), a straddle which combines a long put with a long call, and a 
complex operation. The graph simplified the presentation of a straddle, which Lefèvre 
cumbersomely called “achat à prime direct contre vente à prime inverse”. Figure 2 to 4 reproduce 
profit charts from Moser’s book, which includes many more charts. Figure 2 displays a long call 
option on top and a short call option at the bottom, and Figure 3 shows a straddle on top and a 
long contract with 2-times Noch at the bottom. In the contract with Noch it is assumed that a 
person buys a share and two call options on the share with a strike price of 61, paying 60 for the 
entire package. As there is no premium involved in a transaction with Noch, the price of 60 
equals the sum of the share’s spot price and two premiums for the call options. Moser (1875) 
used the profit charts to investigate the relationships between various derivative contracts. The 
top panel in Figure 4 shows how a long forward contract can be combined with a long put option 
to create the profit of a long call option (solid line), and in the bottom panel a long put option and 
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It is unclear who invented profit charts. Moser (1875, p. V) mentions that he started to work 
on his book in 1870, but Lefèvre published profit charts before Moser. After studying science, 
Lefèvre had turned toward financial journalism and a career in banking and insurance. On the 
title page of some of his works he mentions that he was a private secretary of Baron de 
Rothschild. It is possible that Lefèvre invented profit charts, but it is more likely that they 
originated in financial markets in Paris in the 1860s and Lefèvre became aware of them through 
his interaction with derivative dealers and bankers, including Baron de Rothschild. As Moser 
started to work on his book in 1870, profit charts must have been known in financial circles in 
Berlin by that time.  
In 1885, derivative contracts became legally enforceable in France, although it was still 
possible to raise the objection against gambling under some circumstances. In Germany the 
regulatory framework was similar to that in France for most of the nineteenth century, i.e. 
derivatives were traded in a legal limbo. In Prussia contracts for future delivery were outlawed 
for Spanish government bonds in 1836, for all foreign securities in 1840, and for securities of 
railways in 1844. After the unification of Germany in 1871, it was up to the courts to decide 
whether a contract for future delivery was legitimate or whether it was motivated by illegal 
gambling. The courts took into consideration the contract’s terms, the profession and wealth of 
each party and anything else that might shed light on the contract’s purpose, which all gave rise 
to considerable legal uncertainties. In 1896, Germany passed a law (Börsengesetz) that severely 
restricted derivative dealings. It became illegal to conclude contracts for the future delivery of 
wheat and milling products, and for shares of mines and factories. The government also could 
regulate and prohibit contracts for all other goods and financial assets. These severe restrictions 
disrupted commodity markets and financial markets in Germany, diverting trade in commodities 
and securities to foreign exchanges. By the end of the nineteenth century, German financial 
markets had reached a size that it was no longer possible to avoid regulations by moving into   38
coffee houses and allies. Schanz (1906, pp. 527-536) claimed that commodity prices became 
more volatile and, since more cash transactions were conducted, the demand for cash increased. 
The business community also complained that in some locations price quotations for 
commodities ceased because exchanges had closed down.  
The German law of 1896 also determined that contracts for future delivery were enforceable 
only if both parties had registered as dealers. The unintended consequence of this provision was 
that most dealers chose not to register, returning to a system of trading that was based on 
reputation. In 1900, there were only 212 registered commodity dealers and 175 registered 
security dealers at all 29 German exchanges. But German commodity and financial markets had 
long outgrown the small-town conditions of pre-industrial derivative trading, where reputation 
based trading worked well. The presence of a large number of persons whose contracts were not 
enforceable caused problems because people had become accustomed to trading anonymously. 
Schanz (1906, p. 533) maintains that during the downturn in stock prices in the spring of 1900, 
many unregistered persons, including merchants and bankers, simultaneously bought shares 
forward and sold them forward. Allegedly, they then abandoned the position that produced a loss, 
thus taking advantage of the fact that their contracts were legally nonbinding. The German 
restrictions on derivative trading were a self-inflicted wound on the German economy at the turn 
of the nineteenth to the twentieth century. Although the German government again relaxed some 
restrictions, Germany lacked an effective regulatory framework for derivative markets at the 
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6. Conclusion 
The history of derivatives is as old as the history of commerce. Farmers, manufacturers and 
merchants face risks because the production and distribution of goods takes time. Prices may 
change between the time the production decision is made and the sale of goods, and unforeseen 
circumstances may arise during the production process and distribution of goods. Forward 
contracts remove the price risk of future transactions, and options limit the risk of future 
transactions to the option premium. An efficient allocation of the risk of future transactions 
increases output because it enhances specialization among producers both locally and between 
distant markets. 
 In this chapter, the history of derivatives from antiquity to the time of Louis Bachelier and 
Vinzenz Bronzin is traced. Contracts for future delivery of goods spread from Mesopotamia to 
Hellenistic Egypt and the Roman world. After the collapse of the Roman Empire, contracts for 
future delivery continued to be used in the Byzantine Empire in the eastern Mediterranean and 
they survived in canon law in western Europe. During the Renaissance, financial markets became 
more sophisticated in Italy and the Low Countries. An important financial innovation were 
securities, which were issued as a source of funds by merchants (bills of exchange), governments 
(bonds) and joint-stock companies (shares). The first derivatives on securities were written in the 
Low Countries in the sixteenth century. Derivative trading on securities spread from Amsterdam 
to England and France at the turn of the seventeenth to the eighteenth century, and from France to 
Germany in the early nineteenth century.  
During the process of writing this chapter, two issues arose that should be investigated 
further by someone who has access to the sources and the skills to use these sources. The first 
issue is the role of Sephardic Jews in the spread of derivatives from the Roman world, across the 
divide of the Middle Ages, to the Low Countries. Swan (2000, pp. 105-107) argues that during 
the Middle Ages derivatives continued to be used in monasteries and at fairs under the auspices   40
of the Church because derivatives survived in canon law, which was influenced by Roman law. 
This argument fails to explain why derivatives on securities emerged in the Low Countries in the 
sixteenth century, and not in Italian city states where securities (monti shares) had become 
negotiable much earlier, in the thirteenth century. Certainly, canon law must have been more 
influential in catholic Italy between the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries than in the protestant 
Low Countries in the sixteenth century.  
An alternative hypothesis is that derivatives were introduced in the Low Countries by 
Sephardic Jews, who lived in Spain and Portugal and whose ancestry lay in Mesopotamia and 
Persia. Jews had prospered in Spain under Moslem rule from the eighth to the twelfth century. 
During the Christian reconquest of Spain, they were in and out of favor with rulers, depending on 
political and economic expedience. In 1492, Jews were either expelled from Spain or forcibly 
converted to Christianity. Sephardic Jews were transported to northern Africa and the eastern 
Mediterranean, and a significant group moved to Portugal, where they had the misfortune to be 
expelled again in 1497. From Portugal they fled to northern Europe, including the Low Countries. 
Both Isaac Le Maire (1558-1624), who conducted the short selling operation against the Dutch 
East India Company, and Joseph de la Vega (1650-1692?), who wrote Confusion de Confusiones, 
belonged to the community of exiled Sephardic Jews in Amsterdam. The comment of Cristobal 
de Villalon (1542), which was reproduced in Section 2, shows that contracts for differences were 
used in Spain and the Low Countries.
8 It is a promising hypothesis that Sephardic Jews carried 
derivative trading from Mesopotamia to Spain during Roman times and the first millennium AD, 
and to the Low Countries in the sixteenth century. The hypothesis that derivative trading spread 
from Mesopotamia via Spain to the Low Countries should be investigated by an economic 
                                                 
8 Cristobal de Villalon lived in Valladolid, a city in north-central Spain. He published a book on 
Spanish grammar (Gramática Castellana) in Antwerp in 1558. The moral outrage that he 
expressed about contracts for differences may have been a ruse to elude the Inquisition. Similarly, 
Coffinière (1824) feigned moral outrage to protect his reputation as an advocate (Section 5). 
Nothing is known on de Villalon’s ancestry.   41
historian with a background in finance who has access to Spanish archives and knowledge of 
Arabic, Hebrew, Latin and Spanish. Given these demanding requirements, it is not surprising that 
nobody has so far considered the role of Sephardic Jews in the spread of derivatives. 
The second issue that needs further investigation is the role of banks in derivative markets. 
Not much is known on the use of derivatives by banks, but there is reason to believe that bankers 
and banks were at the forefront of derivative trading during the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. Banks underwrote government bonds and shares of joint-stock companies and they 
invested in these securities. The business with securities (Effektengeschäft) was highly profitable 
and it is likely that it involved deals that were settled at a future date. Since personal relationships 
remained important, derivatives continued to be traded over-the-counter until the nineteenth 
century. This provided an opportunity for well connected banking houses, for example Bank 
Rothschild, which operated informal derivative markets either in-house or between banks. Mayer 
Amschel Rothschild (1744-1812), who founded the Bank Rothschild in Frankfurt, sent his sons 
Nathan, James, Salomon and Carl to London (1798), Paris (1812), Vienna (1820) and Naples 
(1821) to open banks; first-born Amschel stayed in Frankfurt. Reputation based derivative trading 
survived until the nineteenth century because it was supported by a strong constituency of 
security dealers and bankers. 
The information on derivative dealings of banks is scarce because they kept operations secret 
as far as possible and their customers valued privacy. Many banks operated as sole proprietors 
and partnerships, with no need to divulge information to shareholders and the public. The 
following circumstantial evidence suggests that banks were active in derivative markets during 
the nineteenth century. (1) Henri Lefèvre, who - as mentioned in Section 5 - published the first 
profit charts for options, was a private secretary of Baron de Rothschild in Paris. (2) Bankers 
jealously guarded the profitable business with securities. The Bank in Zürich, which issued bank 
notes, was founded with the help of private banking houses in 1836. Bleuler (1913, p. 30, n. 1)   42
argues that the Bank in Zürich did not deal with securities as a concession to private bankers 
whose support it needed. Indeed, Bank Rothschild of Frankfurt subscribed to five percent of the 
bank’s capital at its foundation (Bleuler 1913, p. 26, n. 1). (3) The Swiss Federal Law on the 
Issue of Bank Notes of 1881 made it illegal for banks of issue to participate in contracts for future 
delivery of securities and goods, both on their own account and on account of third parties.
9 To 
avoid the restriction on derivatives and other regulations, large Swiss banks, the so-called 
“Grossbanken” which included the Schweizerische Kreditanstalt ( Credit Suisse),  Bank in 
Winterthur, Basler Handelsbank and Schweizerische Volksbank, chose not to issue bank notes in 
the nineteenth century. The Eidgenössische Bank and some smaller banks abandoned the issue of 
bank notes after the enactment of the Federal Law on the Issue of Bank Notes.
10 Derivative 
dealings of banks and bankers almost certainly surpassed dealings in coffee houses and allies, 
which attracted the ire of the authorities in Paris and elsewhere. The fact that it is difficult and 
even impossible to find solid quantitative information on a historical issue does not prove that the 
issue was not important. This is particularly true in the history of derivative markets and in 






                                                 
9 Article 16 of the Law applied the restriction on derivative dealings only to banks of issue that 
specialized in the discount of commercial bills (Diskontbanken), and not to banks that kept 
securities as reserves and state-run cantonal banks. The charters of some small Swiss banks 
included provisions against time dealings.  
10 The Bank in Winterthur, Basler Handelsbank and Eidgenössische Bank became UBS, and 
Credit Suisse absorbed the Schweizerische Volksbank. The Eidgenössische Bank and the short-
lived Banque Général Suisse were the only large banks that issued bank notes for some time. 
Weber (1988, 1992) deals with the issue of bank notes by Swiss banks in the nineteenth century.    43
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